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Introduction 
The article provides an outline of the ontological interpretation of informational privacy 
based on information ethics (Floridi [forthcoming-b]). It is part of a larger project of 
research, in which I have developed the foundations of ideas presented here (Floridi 
[forthcoming-c]) and their consequences (Floridi [forthcoming-a]) 
As an outline, it is meant to be self-sufficient and to provide enough information 
to enable the reader to assess how the approach fares with respect to other alternatives. 
However, those interested in a more detailed analysis, and especially in the reasons 
offered in its favour, may wish to consult the other articles as well.  
 
A simplified model 
Let me start by introducing a simplified model of a situation in which informational 
privacy might be at stake. Imagine a limited (region of the) infosphere, represented by 
some patients (our interactive, informational agents) admitted to the same hospital (our 
limited environment (for an empirical assessment see Bäck and Wikblad [1998]). 
Infosphere is a neologism I coined years ago on the basis of “biosphere”, a term 
referring to that limited region on our planet that supports life. It denotes the whole 
informational environment constituted by all informational entities (thus including 
informational agents as well), their properties, interactions, processes and mutual 
relations. It is an environment comparable to, but different from cyberspace (which is 
only one of its sub-regions, as it were), since it includes also off-line and analogue 
spaces of information.  
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Intuitively, given a certain amount of available information somewhere in the 
infosphere, the larger the informational gap among the agents, the less they know about 
each other, the more private their lives can be.  
The informational gap among the agents may be described as a function of the 
degree of accessibility of personal data. In the example, there will be more or less 
informational privacy depending on whether rooms in the ward are designed for one or 
two patients and whether each is equipped with its own bathroom.  
Accessibility, in its turn, is an epistemic factor that depends on the ontological 
features of the infosphere, i.e. on the nature of the specific agents, of the specific 
environment in which they are embedded and of the specific interactions implementable 
in that environment by those agents. If the partitions in the ward are few and thin, and 
all the patients have excellent hearing, the degree of accessibility is increased, the 
informational gap is reduced and informational privacy is more difficult to obtain and 
protect. Thus, the ontological features of the infosphere determine a specific degree of 
ontological friction regulating the information flow within the system.  
By ontological friction I mean to refer here to the forces that oppose the 
information flow within (a region of) the infosphere, and hence (as a coefficient) to the 
amount of work and efforts required for a certain kind of agent to obtain, filter and/or 
block information (also, but not only) about other agents in a given environment, e.g. by 
establishing and maintaining channels of communication and by overcoming obstacles 
in the flow of information such as distance, noise, lack of resources (especially time and 
memory), amount and complexity of the data to be processed, and so forth. 
Of course, the informational affordances and constraints provided by an 
environment are such only in relation to agents with specific informational capacities. In 
our model, brick walls afford much higher ontological friction for the flow of acoustic 
information than a paper-thin partition, but this is irrelevant if the patients are deaf.  
Let me now summarize the previous analysis. What we have seen is that, given a 
certain amount of personal information available in (a region of) the infosphere I, the 
lower the ontological friction in I, the higher the accessibility of personal information 
about the agents embedded in I, the smaller the informational gap among them, and the 
lower the level of informational privacy implementable about each of them. Put simply, 
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informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere. It 
follows that any factor affecting the latter will also affect the former.  
 
ICT as re-ontologizing technologies 
The factors in question can vary and may concern more or less temporary or reversible 
changes in the environment or in the agents. Because of their “data superconductivity”, 
ICTs are well-known for being among the most influential factors that affect the 
ontological friction in the infosphere (Moor [1997] highlights a similar point “When 
information is computerised, it is greased to slide easily and quickly to many ports of 
call” (p. 27). A crucial difference between old and new ICTs is how they affect it. 
Old or pre-digital ICTs have always tended to reduce the ontological friction, 
and hence informational privacy in the infosphere, because they enhance or augment the 
agents embedded in it.  
New or digital ICTs are different in that, being interactive, they can also increase 
informational privacy or indeed change (what one appreciates as) informational privacy 
insofar as they re-ontologize the very nature of the infosphere, that is, of the 
environment itself, of the agents embedded in it and of their interactions. Re-
ontologizing is another neologism that I have recently coined in order to refer to a very 
radical form of re-engineering, one that not only designs, constructs or structures a 
system (e.g. a company, or a machine) anew, but that fundamentally transforms its 
intrinsic nature. In this sense, for example, nanotechnologies and biotechnologies are 
not merely re-engineering but actually re-ontologizing our world. 
Digital ICTs are re-ontologizing devices because they engineer new 
environments that the user/agent is then enabled to inhabit. Imagine, for example, that 
all the walls and the furniture in the ward are transformed into perfectly transparent 
glass. Assuming our patients have good sight, this will drastically reduce the ontological 
friction in the system. Imagine next that the patients are transformed into proficient 
mind-readers and telepathists. Any informational privacy in this sort of Bentham’s 
PanOpticon will become virtually impossible. In “The Dead Past” Asimov [1956] 
describes a chronoscope, a device that allows direct observation of past events. The 
chronoscope turns out to be of only limited use for archaeologists, since it can look only 
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a couple of centuries in the past, but people discover that it can easily be tuned to the 
most recent past, with a granularity of fractions of seconds before. Through the 
chronoscope one can observe any event almost in real time. It is the end of privacy, for 
the dead past is only a synonym for “the living present”, as one of the characters 
remarks, rather philosophically. 
These thought experiments illustrate how radical modifications in the very 
nature (that is to say, a re-ontologization) of the infosphere can dramatically change the 
conditions of possibility of informational privacy.  
To summarise: informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in 
the infosphere. Many factors can affect the latter, including, most importantly, 
technological innovations and social developments. Old ICTs affected the ontological 
friction in the infosphere mainly by enhancing or augmenting the agents embedded into 
it; therefore, they tended to decrease the degree of informational privacy possible within 
the infosphere. On the contrary, digital ICTs affect the ontological friction in the 
infosphere both by allowing forms of protection of informational privacy and, most 
significantly, by re-ontologizing it; not only can they both decrease and protect 
informational privacy but, most importantly, they can also alter its nature and hence our 
understanding and appreciation of it. 
 
Privacy in the infosphere 
Interpreting the revolutionary nature of digital ICTs in this ontological way provides a 
fruitful approach to develop a robust theory of informational privacy. In the same way 
as the digital revolution is best understood as a fundamental re-ontologization of the 
infosphere, informational privacy requires an equally radical re-interpretation, one that 
takes into account the essentially-informational nature of human beings and of their 
operations as social agents. Such re-interpretation is achieved by considering each 
individual as constituted by his or her information, and hence by understanding a breach 
of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity.  
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that digital ICTs can both erode 
and reinforce informational privacy, and hence that a positive effort needs to be made in 
order to support not only PET but also poietic (i.e. constructive) applications, which 
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may allow users to design, shape and maintain their identities as informational agents 
(Floridi and Sanders [2005]). The information flow requires some friction in order to 
keep firm the distinction between the multiagent system (the society) and the identity of 
the agents (the individuals) constituting it. Any society (even a utopian one) in which no 
informational privacy is possible is one in which no personal identity can be maintained 
and hence no welfare can be achieved, social welfare being only the sum of the 
individuals’ involved. The total “transparency” of the infosphere that may be advocated 
by some– recall the example of the glassy hospital and of our mentally super-enhanced 
patients – achieves the protection of society only by erasing all personal identity and 
individuality, a “final solution” for sure, but hardly one that the individuals themselves, 
constituting the society so protected, would be happy to embrace freely. As Cohen 
[2000] has remarked, “The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to chill the 
expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our 
aspirations to it.” (p. 1426). 
 Looking at the nature of a person as being constituted by that person’s 
information allows one to understand the right to informational privacy as a right to 
personal immunity from unknown, undesired or unintentional changes in one’s own 
identity as an informational entity, either actively – collecting, storing, reproducing, 
manipulating etc. one’s information amounts now to stages in stealing, cloning or 
breeding someone else’s personal identity – or passively – as breaching one’s 
informational privacy may now consist in forcing someone to acquire unwanted data, 
thus altering her or his nature as an informational entity without consent (This view is 
close to the interpretation of privacy in terms of protection of human dignity defended 
by Bloustein [1964]). Brain-washing is as much a privacy breach as mind-reading. 
The ontological interpretation suggests that one’s informational sphere and one’s 
personal identity are co-referential, or two sides of the same coin: “you are your 
information”, so anything done to your information is done to you, not to your 
belongings. It follows that the right to informational privacy (both in the active and in 
the passive sense just seen) shields one’s personal identity. This is why informational 
privacy is extremely valuable and ought to be respected. Consequentialist concerns may 
override respect for informational privacy, but the ontological interpretation, by 
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equating its protection to the protection of personal identity, considers it a fundamental 
and inalienable right (for a different view see Volkman [2003]), so that, by default, the 
presumption should always be in favour of its respect (this of course is not to say that 
informational privacy is never negotiable in any degree). 
Heuristically, violations of informational privacy are more fruitfully comparable 
to kidnapping rather than trespassing: the observed is moved to an observer’s local 
space of observation (a space which is remote for the observed), unwillingly and 
possibly unknowingly. What is abducted is personal information and no actual removal 
is in question, but a cloning of the relevant piece of personal information. Yet the 
cloned information is not a “space” that belongs to the observed and which has been 
trespassed; it is part of the observed herself, or better something that (at least partly) 
constitutes the observed for what she or he is.  
A further advantage, brought about by this change in perspective, is that it 
becomes possible to dispose of the false dichotomy qualifying informational privacy in 
public or in private contexts. Insofar as a piece of information constitutes an agent, it 
does so context-independently and that is why the observed may wish to preserve her 
integrity and uniqueness as an informational entity, even when she is in an entirely 
public place. After all, trespassing makes no sense in a public space, but kidnapping is a 
crime independently of where it is committed. 
Finally, one may still argue that an agent “owns” his or her information, yet no 
longer in a vaguely metaphorical sense, but in the precise sense in which an agent is her 
or his information. “My” in “my information” is not the same “my” as in “my car” but 
rather the same “my” as in “my body” or “my feelings”: it expresses a sense of 
constitutive and intimate belonging, not of external and detachable ownership, a sense 
in which my body, my feelings and my information are part of me but are not my (legal) 
possessions. As Warren and Brandeis [1890] wrote: ““[...] the protection afforded to 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions [...] is merely an instance of the enforcement of the 
more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted 
or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously persecuted, the 
right not to be defamed [or, the right not to be kidnapped, my addition]. In each of these 
rights [...] there inheres the quality of being owned or possessed and [...] there may be 
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some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But, obviously, they bear little 
resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under that term. The principle [...] is in 
reality not the principle of private propriety but that of inviolate personality (p. 31, 
emphasis added) [...] the right to privacy, as part of the more general right to the 
immunity of the person, [is] the right to one’s personality (p. 33, emphasis added). 
The ontological interpretation stresses that informational privacy is also a matter 
of construction of one’s own informational identity. The right to be let alone is also the 
right to be allowed to experiment with one’s own life, to start again, without having 
records that mummify one’s personal identity forever, taking away from the individual 
the power to mould it. Everyday, a person may wish to build a different, possibly better, 
“I”. We never stop becoming ourselves, so protecting a person’s informational privacy 
also means allowing that person the freedom to change, ontologically. In this sense, 
Johnson [2001] seems to be right in considering informational privacy an essential 
element in an individual’s autonomy (Moor [1997], referring to a previous edition of 
Johnson [2001], disagrees). 
  
 8
References 
Asimov, I. 1956, "The Dead Past", Astounding Science Fiction, 6-46.  
Bäck, E., and Wikblad, K. 1998, "Privacy in Hospital", Journal of Advanced Nursing, 
27(5), 940-945.  
Bloustein, E. 1964, "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser", New York University Law Review, 39, 962-1007.  
Cohen, J. 2000, "Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object", 
Stanford Law Review, 52 1373 - 1437.  
Floridi, L. forthcoming-a, "Four Challenges for a Theory of Informational Privacy", 
Ethics and Information Technology.  
Floridi, L. forthcoming-b, "Information Ethics" in Moral Philosophy and Information 
Technology, edited by Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press),  
Floridi, L. forthcoming-c, "The Ontological Interpretation of Informational Privacy", 
Ethics and Information Technology.  
Floridi, L., and Sanders, J. W. 2005, "Internet Ethics: The Constructionist Values of 
Homo Poieticus" in The Impact of the Internet on Our Moral Lives, edited by 
Robert Cavalier (New York: SUNY),  
Johnson, D. G. 2001, Computer Ethics 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall).  
Moor, J. H. 1997, "Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age", ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society, 27, 27-32.  
Warren, S., and Brandeis, L. D. 1890, "The Right to Privacy", Harvard Law Review, 
193(4).  
 
 
